The Iranian network behind terror in Australia

The Sydney Chanukah attack was exceptional in its scope, weaponry and planning, but it represents the peak of an antisemitic terror wave that has struck Australia, some with proven foreign involvement.

Initial findings point to an ISIS connection, not Iran, which has been proven responsible for torching synagogues and Jewish businesses in the country. The distinction between streams of radical Islam does not diminish the threat: The Iranian model is sometimes replicated in other influence networks, both state and non-state, and in any case, it lays the “fertilizer” for attacks on Jewish life.

In August, Australian intelligence concluded that Iran stood behind two attacks: the arson of a kosher delicatessen in Sydney and the torching of a synagogue in Melbourne. 

The investigation revealed that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) recruited local criminals for the “dirty work”—attacking Jewish institutions. In response, Australia expelled the Iranian ambassador, closed its embassy in Tehran, and declared the IRGC a terrorist organization. This marked the first time Australia has expelled an ambassador since World War II.

Tehran also operates “soft power” mechanisms, which allow it and Hezbollah to expand their influence in countries with a significant Shi’ite minority. Among these mechanisms are control over the appointment of imams in religious centers, academic branches of Iran’s Al-Mustafa University, cultural centers of the embassy, and the media activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting outlet.

In Australia, the influence has manifested itself in trips to Lebanon and meetings with Hezbollah officials, and in money transfers through Qard al-Hassan (Hezbollah’s banking institution)—as revealed in the breach of the organization’s systems.

The disregard for Iran and Hezbollah’s “enabling infrastructure” in Australia created a sense of comfort for the Islamists to operate in the country without interference.

Similar to the Iranian operational pattern of recruiting Australian criminals for “dirty work” on behalf of the IRGC, there has been evidence in the past of connections between criminal elements and Shi’ite religious institutions, and figures from the Australian underworld were linked to a money laundering network that operated for Hezbollah’s benefit.

As a result, Shi’ite religious centers became the leaders of anti-Israel demonstrations after Oct. 7, 2023, waving terror flags without any interference. Iranian Ambassador Ahmad Sadeghi did not hesitate to praise slain Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, while the embassy simultaneously intensified surveillance and persecution of Iranian dissidents in Australia.

The battle is only beginning

Iran operates similar networks around the world: the Quds Force planning an attack from Venezuela against the Israeli embassy in Mexico, recruiting Swedish teenagers to attack the embassy in Stockholm, and attempting to harm Israel-Thailand relations through pressure on Thai workers.

In Britain, Iranian accounts were exposed, pushing for Scottish independence to weaken the kingdom from within.

In Italy, Iranian elements used the cultural center in Rome to track exiles, and in Germany, the government admitted that the Al-Mustafa University branch in Berlin became a spy center.

The Israel-centric view of the Iranian threat causes Israel to miss an opportunity. While Israel focuses on the Iranian power structure—the nuclear program and missiles—Iran enjoys broad freedom of action far from the Middle East. But these developments also create fertile ground for cooperation with countries facing the same negative Iranian influence, and sometimes they are not aware of the danger.

Western countries are dealing with large-scale immigration, exposing them to various types of foreign influence. Exposing the way Iran uses the Shi’ite diaspora and the religious power it holds within it could serve as a model for dealing with other radical networks, from ISIS’s online and partisan networks, through mosque unions controlled by other Middle Eastern states, to nonreligious state influence.

In the past year, there has been a bit of awakening. Alongside Australia’s moves, Germany closed the Al-Mustafa branch in Berlin and expelled the imam at the Blue Mosque in Hamburg, who was accused of receiving direct instructions from the Iranian supreme leader’s office. The “hysterical” response of the regime to any damage to these mechanisms indicates their importance, as well as the fact that the battle is only beginning.

Whether Iran is responsible for the Sydney attack or not, history proves the need to fight the enabling infrastructure.

Originally published by Israel Hayom.

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