Palestine Recognition Undermines Law
Many states have decided to recognise a State of Palestine. This decision undermines international law and established norms for defining statehood. Unilateral recognition violates the Oslo Accords, a treaty that remains binding on both parties. The Accords defer determination of borders to final status negotiations and preclude actions that prejudice either party’s rights in this regard. Disregarding the Accords for the sake of symbolic recognition sets a troubling precedent that treaties—as legally binding instruments—can be cast aside for political expediency. This risks undermining the rule of law and treaty obligations everywhere—a cornerstone of stable international relations.
“Unilateral recognition violates the Oslo Accords, a treaty that remains binding on both parties”
Recognition does not confer statehood; in order to qualify as a state, and entity must satisfy the established criteria under international law. This is essential for maintaining stability and coherence within the international system. ‘Palestine’ fails to meet the established legal criteria for statehood under Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). The four legal requirements are: permanent population, defined territory, effective government, and capacity to enter foreign relations.
The requirement for defined territory does not necessitate perfectly settled borders, but it does require a consistent, identifiable area over which a state exercises sovereign authority. The Oslo Accords constrain the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) ability to exercise sovereignty over defined borders by granting it only limited self-governance in certain areas, pending a negotiated settlement—until then, the borders remain disputed.
Additionally, as per the Accords, Israel still exercises control over parts of the West Bank. Meanwhile, the Palestinian territories have been divided since Hamas overthrew the PA and took control in 2007. These factors prevent the PA from functioning as a unified and effective government over a defined territory. Moreover, while the PA engages in some diplomatic activities, its divided governance and limited authority in areas under Israeli control also hinder its capacity to consistently conduct foreign relations as a sovereign entity.
International law recognises self-determination as a fundamental principle, but it does not guarantee statehood as an outcome. In fact, a wide variety and range of national self-determination practices and precedents are implemented and recognised under international law. Its variables include qualified international sovereignty, non-fully independent defence and security arrangements, reduced participation in the United Nations bodies, subordination of international trade to other managerial bodies, dependency on foreign currencies for financial transactions, and geographically non-contiguous territories.
The Oslo Accords made leaps towards arrangements that would achieve such Palestinian self-determination while preserving Israeli sovereign security. It is arguable that, by establishing the Palestinian Authority to govern autonomously in prescribed territories over the Palestinian Arabs, the Oslo Accords have already gone a long way to implement Palestinian self-determination without state sovereignty.
Further development of Palestinian self-determination could take different forms. External self-determination could take the form of qualified statehood in relation to military, trade, currency or international relations. Internal self-determination could take the form of a regional independence within the sovereignty of Egypt, Israel or Jordan, or joint sovereignty, that provides for Palestinian autonomous control of regional resources, cultural, linguistic and political life. Palestine might be regarded as a non-sovereign self-governing territory under Israel and/or Jordan or Egypt but not incorporated into either, or another arrangement might be to establish a pact of federation of Palestine with Israel or Jordan or Egypt.
“Further development of Palestinian self-determination could take different forms”
For example, as recently as 1 June 2025, UK and Morocco issued a joint communiqué that proposed local self-government under Moroccan sovereignty, by the Saharawi people, in the Western Sahara. This proposal is supported by Portugal, Spain, the USA and France. The communiqué states that: “The UK, in encouraging the relevant parties to engage, urgently and positively with the UN-led political process, considers Morocco’s autonomy proposal, submitted in 2007 as the most credible, viable and pragmatic basis for a lasting resolution of the dispute.”
A comparable internal autonomy regime might be appropriate for an Arab population in disputed Palestine. Various arrangements for self-determination can include federation, consensual provisions for geographic regionalisation with devolved autonomous government under a central sovereign state, as well as provisions for multiple distinct languages and financial currencies within a state.
Cultural and political regional autonomy within a sovereign state is also well-established in state internal practice. Political systems distinct from the national governmental system operate in Québec, Canada; Hong Kong, China; Puerto Rico, USA; and Dutch Caribbean special municipalities. Countries with multiple official languages include Bolivia, Canada, Belgium, India, Israel, Singapore, South Africa and Switzerland. Two countries even have multiple heads of state under one sovereignty: San Marino (2) Switzerland (7).
“It is remarkable that international discourse has ignored the multitude of other possibilities than full statehood for Palestinian self-determination”
Non-sovereign self-ruling territories tend to take two forms: unincorporated self-ruling territories, or incorporated state territories. The former include the British Channel Islands and Isle of Man, the Danish Faroe Islands and Greenland, New Zealand’s Tokelau, and American self-ruling unincorporated territories (American Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico). The latter incorporated state territories are island territories that have been incorporated into states, as is the case in Australian, British, Dutch French and Spanish island territories.
It is remarkable that international discourse has ignored the multitude of other possibilities than full statehood for Palestinian self-determination in circumstances where they are so obviously needed. This is a likely result of the half-century long zero-sum diplomatic offensive against the legitimacy of the State of Israel as a Jewish state, organised by the Arab League and Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, in broad coalition with regional neighbours, economically dependent clients and some predominantly hostile allies. This gambit posits Palestinian Arab statehood as a strategy opposed to Jewish statehood.
The legal concept of statehood and the integrity of international law are collateral damage in the Palestinian statehood diplomatic offensive.
