The deterrence delusion: The case for a doctrine of decisive victory

The Oct. 7 massacre and ensuing multifront war against the State of Israel were the inevitable conclusion of the doctrine of deterrence. The belief that our enemies were deterred was not just wrong; it was a catastrophic failure of judgment. Much has changed in Israeli policy and public opinion since then, but not enough. Israel must now adopt a doctrine of decisive victory—a strategy that seeks not to manage a threat but to eliminate the enemy’s capacity to fight.

Deterrence assumes that projecting power can convince an enemy that the cost of attacking outweighs the gain. This theory may work with rational actors, though never with Islamists and rarely with other kinds of authoritarians. This delusion resulted in repeated cycles of military operations against Hamas, euphemistically known as “mowing the lawn.” Each round ended with a ceasefire that Israeli leaders framed as a victory. Hamas viewed it very differently.

In Islamic doctrine, hudna allows for tactical truces to regroup, rearm and prepare for the next phase of jihad. I raised this warning with Israeli officials more than a decade ago. While many in the political and security establishments believed Hamas was deterred, it was, in fact, preparing for Oct. 7. The writing was on the wall. We chose not to read it.

This flawed logic also dictated our strategy toward Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Authority. Instead of forcing fundamental changes within the P.A. leadership and its education system, Israel relied on minor punishments and tax-withholding. The P.A. is arguably more dangerous to Israel than Hamas because it excels at the long game, weaponizing diplomacy and international institutions to delegitimize Israel while nurturing a culture that rewards violence against Jews.

Similarly, we allowed Iran to encircle Israel with a “ring of fire” for decades without repercussions. Israel struck weapons shipments and responded to attacks by hitting proxies but avoided confronting Iran itself. Deterrence signaled to Tehran that Israel would absorb aggression as long as it came through intermediaries.

Responses must not be proportional. They must be overwhelming.

This is the core failure of deterrence. It never produces victory. It cedes the initiative to the enemy, allowing them to choose the timing, method and scale of conflict. Most critically, deterrence cannot work against Islamist movements because murdering and subjugating “infidels” is their raison d’être. You cannot deter an ideology that values death more than life. Your only option is to destroy it.

Since the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the Jewish state has undergone a profound strategic shift, abandoning restraint and acting decisively against its enemies. The stated objective in Gaza is the complete destruction of Hamas. Israel patiently prepared and executed devastating blows against Hezbollah in Lebanon. After decades of warnings and hesitation, Israel finally struck Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile infrastructure in a preemptive act of self-defense.

But remnants of the old doctrine persist. Officials claimed that we could strike the Houthis until they were deterred. That failed. We still hear assurances that Hezbollah and Iran are “deterred for now.” In reality, our enemies are rearming and reorganizing at full speed. Time favors them, not us. Diplomatic and geopolitical constraints are real, as are limits on stockpiles and military production capacity. But the strategic objective and the message to our enemies must be unmistakable: Your time is running out, and we are coming for you.

A shift from the doctrine of deterrence to the Doctrine of Decisive Victory means fundamentally changing how we plan, speak and act. It requires unapologetically declaring bold goals and clearly defining our enemies, even when doing so is uncomfortable or unpopular. When we strike, we do so with overwhelming force, aimed at decisive and rapid victory. We must complete the systematic destruction of the military capabilities of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, including the elimination of their leadership and maintaining and, where necessary, expanding the buffer zones in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.

In Syria, Israel should deepen support for our natural allies among the Druze and Kurds, and approach the new jihadist president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, as a hostile actor, not a reformer. His claims of moderation bear all the hallmarks of Hudna: tactical restraint in service of future jihad.

Furthermore, Israel must work covertly for regime change in Iran by supporting anti-regime groups on the ground and coordinating with leadership in exile, such as Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. When Iranian proxies attack Israel, Israel must strike both the proxy and targets inside Iran itself. Responses must not be proportional; they must be overwhelming.

We must also recognize the P.A. as a hostile entity, as its charter and actions reveal, and work toward its replacement while exposing Qatar and Turkey as adversaries of Western interests.

Military force alone is not enough. Israel must wage a sustained information campaign that clearly names Islamism and authoritarianism as global threats, while reinforcing bonds with allies who still understand the stakes.

The events of Oct. 7 were the gravest atrocity committed against the Jewish people since the Holocaust. It was not the product of fate, but of accumulated choices, strategic illusions and failures of judgment. That era must now end. Israel must replace doctrines unfit for reality with strategic clarity, resolve and moral confidence. The only question is whether we have the will to carry it through to decisive victory.

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